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Abstract
We provide worst-case bounds for the detection performance of a physical layer authentication
scheme where authentication is based on channel-state information (CSI) observed at multiple distributed
remote radio-heads (RRHs). The bounds are established based on two physical-layer attack strategies that
a sophisticated attacker can launch against a given deployment. First, we consider a power manipulation
attack, in which a single-antenna attacker adopts optimal transmit power and phase, and derive an
approximation for the missed detection probability that is applicable for both statistical and perfect
CSI knowledge at the attacker. Secondly, we characterize the spatial attack position that maximizes the
attackers success probability under strong line-of-sight conditions. We use this to provide a heuristic
truncated search algorithm that efficiently finds the optimal attack position, and hence, constitutes a
powerful tool for planning, analyzing, and optimizing deployments. Interestingly, our results show that
there is only a small gap between the detection performance under a power manipulation attack based
on statistical respectively perfect CSI knowledge, which significantly strengthens the relevance and
applicability of our results in real-world scenarios. Furthermore, our results illustrate the benefits of the
distributed approach by showing that the worst-case bounds can be reduced by 4 orders of magnitude
without increasing the total number of antennas.
Index Terms
Manuscript submitted May 10, 2020. This work was supported in part by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB,
through the CERCES project. The authors want to thank professor James Gross for discussions and insights that contributed to
the completion of this work as well as for proof-reading the final manuscript. H. Forssell and R. Thobaben are with the School
of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden (e-mail: hefo@kth.se;
ragnart@kth.se).
May 15, 2020 DRAFT
Wireless physical layer security, physical layer authentication, optimal attack strategies
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication at the physical (PHY) layer of wireless communications is currently researched
as a means of providing enhanced security in applications where quick authentication with low
complexity and security overhead is desirable. For instance, PHY-layer security techniques have
been considered for ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) to provide security
guarantees even when the room for security overhead and authentication delays is slim-to-none [1,
2]. PHY-layer authentication (PLA) can in such a setting be an effective way to detect and
filter out sophisticated impersonation attacks, which otherwise could degrade the communication
performance and harm the underlying applications.
The core idea of feature-based PLA is to verify the legitimacy of a message by exploiting
characteristic features of the user locations or hardware chipsets that can be inferred from the
received PHY-layer signals. The idea was first introduced in [3] and has since then been studied
in various contexts such as vehicular networks [4], wireless sensor networks [5], and lately, also
in URLLC [2, 6, 7]. Several different PHY-layer features have been employed, ranging from
hardware-specific features such as local oscillator offsets [8], offsets in clock frequencies [9], and
switching transients [10], to location-specific features such as the received signal strength [11],
the wide band multi-path channel [3], and multiple-antenna channels [12, 13]. The big advan-
tage of feature-based PLA is that it requires no additional security overhead, as opposed to
cryptographic authentication and tag-based PLA that rely on embedding a pre-agreed secret
key [14]. This can relieve higher layer protocols from some of the complex key generation and
distribution tasks while still maintaining the message integrity. Key-based approaches are known
to be vulnerable to eavesdropping (e.g., covertness is crucial for a tag-based PLA scheme [14])
and are easily broken if legitimate keys should leak to an attacker. The feature-based approach, on
the other hand, does not suffer from these problems. The use of diverse features and combinations
of features such as, for example, the channel-state information in a multiple antenna system
renders the estimation and impersonation of the legitimate feature a very challenging task for
an attacker.
However, there are also partly unresolved problems related to the feature-based PLA approach:
One problem, that has not received much attention, is that an attacker can use various smart
strategies to mimic the legitimate user features. For instance, carrier frequency offsets can be
impersonated by adapting the transmit frequency to match the legitimate transmitter’s, and RSSIs
can be altered by manipulating the transmit power. With PLA based on more diverse channel
features, an attacker can use pre-coding based on correlated observations to optimally mimic
the legitimate channel feature [13]. Moreover, with the use of location-specific features the
question arises, what is an optimal attack position to mimic the legitimate channel. Apart from
the work in [13, 15–17], performance analysis of PLA under such attacker strategies has not
been extensively studied in previous literature.
Moreover, despite its apparent benefits for the URLLC setting, PLA also introduces system-
level costs due to erroneous authentication decisions. These erroneous decisions, stemming from
the underlying hypothesis tests (i.e., false alarms and missed detections), might have several
unwanted consequences in a mission-critical application like delays due to false alarms or security
breaches due to missed detections. For this reason, when considering the use of PLA for mission-
critical communication scenarios like URLLC, the concepts of security, reliability, and latency
become closely connected. Broadly speaking, for a given choice of authentication threshold,
an appropriate PLA scheme must be able to provide two types of guarantees: Firstly, that the
system-level delay impacts of the authentication scheme are kept within certain limits, a problem
we have studied in our previous works [18–20]; and secondly, that the probability of a successful
attack is guaranteed to be below a certain threshold regardless of the attacker’s capabilities.
In this paper, we develop tools for providing guarantees of the second type. To that end, we
propose to extend array-based PLA to the distributed network setting where multiple remote
radio-heads (RRHs) forward their messages to a centralized processing unit (see as well [19]),
and derive worst-case detection bounds of the system. This distributed system model is motivated
by communication techniques such as distributed MIMO and coordinated multi-point (CoMP).
Authentication is here based on the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) channel states whose
distributions in turn depend on the transmitter’s physical location (i.e., distance and angle-of-
arrival) with respect to the RRHs. To bound the worst-case missed detection probability, in this
paper we define and analyze two PHY-layer attack strategies: (i) a power manipulation attack,
where the attacker adapts power and phase at its single-antenna transmitter in order to shape its
channel response by scaling and phase rotation, and (ii) an optimal position attack, where the
attacker chooses the spatial position so as to optimize her success probability.
The main contributions of this paper are: We propose and analyze the performance of feature-
based PLA in a wireless network with multiple distributed RRHs. We derive the optimal transmit-
power manipulation strategy under perfect channel-state information (CSI) knowledge and the
corresponding worst-case missed detection probability that serves as a worst-case bound for
a given attacker location, given in closed-form for a single RRH and as a saddle-point ap-
proximation for the multiple RRH case. We provide an approximation of the missed detection
probability under any power manipulation strategy, and in particular, for a strategy that only
requires statistical CSI knowledge. We characterize the optimal attacker position with respect
to a given network deployment under strong line-of-sight assumptions and provide a heuristic
truncated search algorithm that significantly reduces the search-space to a set of locally optimal
attack positions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the considered system
model, authentication scheme, and the problem formulation. In Section III, we analyze the power
manipulation attack and provide the corresponding missed detection probabilities. In Section IV,
we study the optimal attacker positions and define the heuristic optimization approach. Section V
provides the numerical evaluation of the derived performance bounds and compares different
deployment strategies. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
Notation: Matrices are represented by bold capital symbols X, and XT and X† denote the
matrix transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively. We let I denote the identity matrix.
Vectors with entries xi are represented by bold lower-case symbols x for which we let ‖x‖ =√|x1|2 + ... + |xn|2 denote the Euclidian norm and ‖x‖2A = x†Ax denote the complex quadratic
form. We use FX(x) to represent the cumulative distribution function of a random variable X .
We let CN (µ,Σ) represent the multivariate proper complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ
and covariance matrix Σ, N (µ,Σ) the corresponding real-valued Gaussian distribution, χ2k a
central χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, and χ2k(λ) a non-central χ
2 distribution with
k degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter λ.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we analyze authentication of uplink transmissions in a wireless system running
a mission-critical application (e.g., sensors sending data to an industrial automation process). As
depicted in Fig. 1, we consider a distributed system architecture consisting of NRRH remote radio-
heads (RRHs), each equipped with NRx receive antennas, connected to a centralized baseband
processor we refer to as Bob. There is a legitimate stationary single-antenna sensor device referred
to as Alice (A) and a rouge device, referred to as Eve (E), attempting to compromise the system
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Fig. 1. System deployment consisting of wireless sensors communicating in uplink to multiple-antenna remote radio-heads
(RRHs), a centralized baseband processor (Bob) connected to the core network, and an adversary (Eve) equipped with wireless
sensor hardware.
by impersonating Alice. The PHY layer authentication scheme considered in this paper, which
will be formally introduced in Section II-B, is designed to protect the system against Eve’s
impersonation attempts by comparing the CSI of each transmission against a pre-stored feature
bank. The rest of this section provides detailed descriptions of the system model assumptions, the
authentication scheme and its error probabilities, and the considered PHY-layer attack strategies
available to Eve.
A. System Model Assumptions
The uplink transmissions are assumed to be organized in periodic frames using time-division
multiple-access (TDMA). Each frame consists of a broadcast beacon, followed by a management
period (MGMT) and a data transmission period (DTP). In the MGMT period devices can request
connecting to the access point (CN), disconnecting (DCN), or resources for transmission of
data payload (DTA). The MGMT period is assumed to be based on low-rate transmissions
and contention access; however, we assume that collisions and decoding errors are handled
appropriately such that we can neglect their impact.
The MAC protocol discussed here is open to certain vulnerabilities. Here, we summarize three
particular vulnerabilities that motivate the need for PLA: (i) a data injection attack where an
attacker sends DTA requests impersonating a legitimate device which allows it to transmit false
data into the core network; (ii) a disassociation attack where an attacker sends fake DCN requests
which allows it to interrupt a legitimate device’s transmission by temporarily disconnecting it;
(iii) a Sybil attack where an attacker sends multiple DTA requests with multiple device IDs
which, due to the limited resources in a frame, reduces the amount of resources available for
legitimate devices.
Generally, one might assume that MGMT requests and DTA transmissions would be encrypted
and authenticated through cryptographic means. However, in a network with many sensors and
simultaneous strict requirements on latency, the overhead due to cryptographic key-agreement
and distribution might not be manageable. Moreover, any given encryption scheme can be broken
if keys somehow were to leak to the attacker.
The PHY-layer channels from the devices to the RRHs are modeled as narrowband single-
input multiple-output (SIMO) channels centered at frequency fc and subject to Rice fading.
Thus, our model assumes that each link has a significant line-of-sight (LoS) component to each
RRH, and therefore, the CSI statistics depend on both the angle-of-arrival (AoA) and distance
with respect to each receive array. We let h
(j)
i denote the (NRx × 1) complex channel vector
from device i = {A,E}1 to array j and model them as circular-symmetric complex Gaussian
(CSCG) vectors h
(j)
i ∼ CN (µ(j)i ,Σ(j)i ) (i.e., narrowband SIMO Rice fading), where we let µ(j)i
and Σ
(j)
i denote the corresponding mean vector and covariance matrix, respectively. We assume
that E[‖h(j)i,j ‖2] = P (j)i NRx where P (j)i represents the average power received per antenna and
that the covariance matrices take the form Σ
(j)
i =
P
(j)
i
KRice+1
Λ, where Λ is a fixed correlation matrix
identical for each RRH. This assumption of equal fading correlation for antennas within an RRH
is reasonable under the assumption that the arrays have the same geometry and that they are
deployed in a homogenous environment. We use a parametric model for the received power per
antenna P
(j)
i =
(
λc
4pid
(j)
i
)β
PTx,i, with λc = c/fc being the wavelength, d
(j)
i the distance, PTx,i the
transmit power, and β a path-loss exponent (i.e., β = 2 represents free-space path loss). Note
also that we deliberately let both transmit power and path-loss be parts of the CSI vectors h
(j)
i
through P
(j)
i since the receiver in practice is unable to differentiate these from each other based
on the received signals.
Finally, we adopt a phased-array model of the expected value of the channels which then
becomes a location-specific statistic of the channel distributions. We denote by Φ
(j)
i the spatial
angle-of-arrival from transmitter i w.r.t. array j and let
µ
(j)
i =
√
P
(j)
i KRice
KRice + 1
× e−
j2pid
(j)
i
λc e(Ω
(j)
i ), (1)
1Note that the model presented in this section extends to multiple devices i = 1, · · · , Ndevices; however, in this paper we only
consider the single legitimate device Alice.
where the array-response vector e(Ω) =
[
1, e−j2pi∆rΩ, · · · , e−j2pi∆r(NRx−1)Ω
]T
is modeling the
phase differences between antenna elements in terms of the angular sine Ω = sin(Φ) and
normalized antenna separation ∆r.
In the following section, we define the PLA scheme based on the model assumptions of this
section that provides an additional layer of security and effectively can detect and filter out the
above-mentioned MAC-layer attacks.
B. Physical Layer Authentication Scheme
In this paper, we consider the authentication problem where Bob receives a message m with
uncertainty as to whether it originated from Alice or Eve. We assume that the message is
intercepted by every RRH and we denote by h˜
(j)
m = CSI(m) the observed channel-state vector
at receive array j. We denote by H0 the hypothesis that the message is from Alice, i.e., that
h˜
(j)
m = h
(j)
A , and by H1 the hypothesis that it is from Eve, i.e., that h˜(j)m = h(j)E . In general, h˜(j)m
would be a channel-state estimate with limited precision; however, to simplify the analysis in
the following we assume perfect CSI at the RRHs. We note, however, that parts of our results
generalize to imperfect CSI and refer to Section III-C for additional details.
Bob’s objective is to centrally decide whether to accept the message or not based on infor-
mation received from the RRHs. For that purpose, we construct the (NRxNRRH × 1) CSI vector
h˜m = [[h˜
(1)
m ]T · · · [h˜(NRRH)m ]T ]T . Given that the message is authentic (i.e., H0 is true), we have
h˜m ∼ CN (µA,ΣA), with
µA =


µ
(1)
A
...
µ
(NRRH)
A

 and ΣA =


Σ
(1)
A 0 · · · 0
0 Σ
(2)
A · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Σ(NRRH)A

 , (2)
where the diagonal structure of ΣA follows from the assumption of independent fading across
RRHs. Now let us introduce the authentication test which is based on the generalized likelihood-
ratio test (GLRT) often used in related work on PLA [3, 13, 21]:
Definition 1 (Authentication Hypothesis Test): Bob makes an acceptance decision according
to the following binary hypothesis test:
d(h˜m)
H1
≷
H0
T, (3)
where d(·) is a discriminant function associated with the channel feature of Alice, given by
d(h˜m) = 2‖h˜m − µA‖2Σ−1A . (4)
In some cases, the CSI might only be locally available at the RRHs and not centrally available
at Bob. However, note that by defining d(j)(h˜) = 2‖h˜(j) − µ(j)A ‖2{Σ(j)
A
}−1
we can write the
discriminant function in (3) as d(h˜m) =
∑NRRH
j=1 d
(j)(h˜
(j)
m ), which holds due to the block diagonal
structure of the covariance matrix ΣA. That is, in practice (3) can be used even if the RRHs
only communicate their individual soft decisions d
(j)
i (h˜) which can be summed up at Bob, rather
than communicating the entire CSI vector h˜.
Discussion: Note that prior to using the PLA scheme, Bob must initially learn the legitimate
statistics µ
(j)
A ,Σ
(j)
A . This is an important problem as well as a common observation in related
PLA literature, where it is often argued that the initial trust is established using cryptographic
authentication whenever a new transmitter joins the network [17]. Another solution in our
scenario would be to use device position information to infer the corresponding channel statistics
from the model (1). Such an approach could also encompass device mobility by allowing the
legitimate feature bank to be time-varying. However, the details of such methods are considered
outside the scope of this work, and we presuppose that Bob (or at least the RRHs) knows the
time-invariant µ
(j)
i ,Σ
(j)
i perfectly.
C. Error Probabilities
Two types of errors can occur in the binary authentication test (3): Type-I error (i.e., false
alarm) when a legitimate message is rejected, and Type-II (i.e., missed detection) when an
adversary message is accepted. The probability of false alarm and missed detection are defined
as pFA(T ) = P(d(h˜m) > T |H0) and pMD(T ) = P(d(h˜m) < T |H1), respectively. It is easy
to show that d(h˜m)|H0 ∼ χ22NRRHNRx , i.e., the discriminant function is following a central
χ2 distribution. Hence, the false alarm probability can be obtained in closed form according
to pFA(T ) = 1 − Fχ22NRRHNRx (T ). The missed detection probability pMD(T ) is generally not
straightforwardly tractable in the multiple RRH case since d(h˜m)|H1 is a weighted sum of
non-central χ2 variables. However, we have previously provided an efficient approximation in
[19].
D. PHY-Layer Attack Strategies
Now we introduce the PHY attack strategies that our worst-case bounds in Section III and IV
are based on.
Definition 2 (PHY Layer Attack 1: Power Manipulation): Eve manipulates the transmit power
and phase at her single-antenna transmitter by employing a complex scaling factor ρEe
jϕE such
that the channel state observed at Bob becomes ηEe
jψEhE. Eve can adopt either a fixed power
manipulation strategy based on statistical CSI or a channel-realization dependent strategy based
on perfect CSI at Eve.
Definition 3 (PHY Layer Attack 2: Attack Position): Eve chooses her spatial position with
respect to the receive arrays to influence the statistics of her channel distribution. The objective
for Eve is to find the optimal position, i.e., the one that maximizes the missed detection probability
with respect to the legitimate device position and the RRH deployment.
These strategies can be launched by external entities (e.g., an attacker positioned in close
proximity to the system, using a stolen device or a software defined radio unit) or internal
devices whose behavior has been hijacked by malicious code. Obviously, these attacks can also
be combined with MAC-layer attacks such as disassociation or Sybil attacks to maximize the
attack impact.
E. Problem Formulation
For the considered PLA scheme, the tradeoff between the false alarm probability and the
missed detection probability is controlled by the authentication threshold T . In a mission-
critical scenario, these probabilities will influence system-level performance (i.e., packet-drops,
delays, etc.) most obviously through the false alarms that cause packet-drops and potentially re-
transmissions. In such contexts, worst-case bounds in the form pMD(T ) < p
(Worst−Case)
MD can prove
exceptionally useful, since they allow Bob to confidently set the highest possible threshold T (that
is causing the minimal amount of false alarms) while still maintaining a guaranteed detection
performance. Providing such bounds and investigating how various design-choices influence them
is the aim of this work. Section III is devoted to analyzing this problem under the optimal power
manipulation attack while Section IV provides solutions under the optimal position attack.
III. POWER MANIPULATION ATTACK
In this section, we provide a worst-case missed detection performance analysis under the opti-
mal power manipulation attack. Recall that under a power manipulation strategy, Eve manipulates
power and phase, modeled by complex scaling factor ηEe
jψE , with the objective to maximize the
success probability given by the probability of missed detection pMD(T ). First, we will derive
the optimal strategy under the assumption that Eve has perfect knowledge of her instantaneous
CSI and provide an approximation of the associated missed detection probability. Next, we will
introduce a strategy based on only statistical CSI knowledge and provide the missed detection
probability under this assumption.
A. Optimal Attack Given Perfect CSI at Eve
Here, we assume that Eve perfectly knows the channel states h
(j)
E with respect to each
RRH, prior to her impersonation attempt. This might be considered an unrealistically com-
petent attacker; however, it is relevant since the missed detection probability under this as-
sumption will serve as a worst-case upper bound for any power manipulation strategy. Con-
sidering that the missed detection probability under the power manipulation attack is defined
by pMD(T ) = P(d(ηEe
jψEhE) < T ), the optimal strategy will be to minimize the discriminant
function d(ηEe
jψEhE) given by (4). That strategy is provided in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Optimal Power Manipulation Attack Given Perfect CSI): The power manipulation
strategy that minimizes the discriminant function (4) is given by
η∗E =
|µ†AΣ−1A hE|
h
†
EΣ
−1
A hE
, ψ∗E = − arg{µ†AΣ−1A hE}, (5)
yielding the minimal achievable lower bound on the discriminant function d(hE) ≥ d(Opt. PMA)
where
d(Opt. PMA) = 2µ†AΣ
−1
A µA
(
1− |µ
†
AΣ
−1
A hE|2
µ
†
AΣ
−1
A µAh
†
EΣ
−1
A hE
)
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Strategy (5) allows us to formulate an upper bound for the detection performance in the
following definition:
Definition 4 (Detection Performance Under Optimal Power Manipulation Attack):
pMD ≤ p(Opt. PMA)MD , P(d(Opt. PMA) < T ) = P
(
|µ†AΣ−1A hE|2
µ
†
AΣ
−1
A µAh
†
EΣ
−1
A hE
> 1− T
2µ†AΣ
−1
A µA
)
. (7)
To provide insight into the problem of evaluating (7), we define t = 1− T
2µ†AΣ
−1
A µA
, z = QAµA
‖QAµA‖
,
and h¯E = Q
†
EhE, where Qi is the Cholesky factorization of Σ
−1
i for i = {A,E}. With some
manipulation (7) can be re-written in terms of a quadratic form
p
(Opt. PMA)
MD (T ) = P(h¯
†
EA(t)h¯E > 0) (8)
where A(t) = Q−1E Q
†
A(zz
† − tI)QA(Q−1E )†.
Note that the determinant |A(t)| = |ΣE||Σ−1A ||zz† − tI| = |ΣE||Σ−1A |(−t)N−1(1 − t) which
implies that, if t > 0 and the total number of antennas N = NRRHNRx is even, |A(t)| < 0
and A(t) will have an odd number of negative eigenvalues. Hence, the probability p
(Opt. PMA)
MD (T )
generally takes the form of the complementary CDF of an indefinite quadratic form in the
complex Gaussian vector h¯E ∼ CN (b, I) with b = Q†EµE. Closed-form expressions for such
distributions are generally not tractable; however, several approximation methods exist in the
literature. In the following, we provide two efficient methods that can be used for evaluating the
probability (7). First, we solve the problem in closed-form in Theorem 1 for the single-array case
(NRRH = 1) by exploiting the particular structure of the matrix A(t). Then we generalize the
result to multiple arrays in Theorem 2(NRRH > 1) based on a previously developed approximation
for CDFs of indefinite quadratic forms [22].
a) Solution for NRRH = 1: In the case of a single receive array, the worst-case missed
detection probability can be evaluated in closed-form. The reason is that under the assumption
NRRH = 1, we can analytically find the eigenvalues of the matrix A, which allows us to write
the statistic as a ratio of two χ2 random variables. This ratio, by definition, follows a doubly
non-central F-distribution for which closed-form distribution functions exist in the literature. We
formulate this result in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Single-Array Worst-Case Missed Detection Probability): For a single receive array
(NRRH = 1), the worst-case missed detection probability can be obtained in closed form
p
(Opt. PMA)
MD (T ) = 1− FDNCF (x; ν1, ν2, k1, k2) (9)
where x = (NRx−1)
(
1− 2µ†AΣ−1A µA
T
)
, ν1 =
2|µ†AΣ
−1
A µE|
2
αµ†
A
Σ−1
A
µA
, ν2 =
2
α
(
µ
†
EΣ
−1
A µE − |µ
†
AΣ
−1
A µE|
2
µ
†
A
Σ−1
A
µA
)
k1 = 2,
k2 = 2(NRx − 1), and
FDNCF (x; ν1, ν2, k1, k2) = e
−
ν1+ν2
2
∞∑
r=0
∞∑
s=0
(
ν1
2
)r
r!
(
ν2
2
)s
s!
I
(
k1x
k2 + k1x
;
n1
2
+ r,
n2
2
+ s
)
(10)
denotes the CDF of a doubly non-central F-distribution with non-centrality parameters ν1 and
ν2, degrees of freedom k1 and k2, written in terms of the incomplete beta function I(q; a, b) =∫ q
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt.
Proof. We start from (7), but instead define h¯E = QAhE where QA again is the Cholesky
factorization of Σ−1A . Using this, we can continue from (7) and write
p
(wc)
MD (T ) = P
( |z†h¯E |2
‖h¯E‖2 > t
)
= P
(
h¯
†
Ez
†zh¯E > th¯
†
Eh¯E
)
= P(h¯†E(z
†z− tI)h¯E > 0). (11)
The matrix A2 = z
†z − tI is clearly Hermitian which means that we can write A2 = U†DU
where D is a real-valued diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues di = −t for i = 1, · · · , NRx − 1
and dNRx = 1 − t and U is an orthonormal matrix with the last column equal to z. Now
since ΣE = αΣA, we can let x , Uh¯E = UQAhE ∼ CN (UQAµE , αI), X1 , |xNRx |2 ∼
2
α
χ22
(
2
α
|[UQAµE ]NRx|2
)
, and
X2 ,
NRx∑
i=1
|xi|2 ∼ 2
α
χ22(NRx−1)
(
2
α
NRx∑
i=1
|[UQAµE ]i|2
)
, (12)
which are independent due to the independence of the elements in x. Based on these definitions
we find that
P(h¯†E(z
†z− tI)h¯E > 0) = P(x†Dx > 0) = P
(
(1− t)|xNRx |2 − t
NRx∑
i=1
|xi|2 > 0
)
= P
(
|xNRx|2∑NRx
i=1 |xi|2
>
t
1− t
)
= P
(
X1
2
X2
2(NRx−1)
> (NRx − 1) t
1− t
)
. (13)
The lefthand-side ratio Y ,
X1
2
X2
2(NRx−1)
in (13) is therefore a ratio of normalized independent
χ2 random variables which by definition follows a doubly non-central F-distribution. Hence,
p
(wc)
MD (T ) = P
(
Y > (NRx − 1) t1−t
)
from which the result in (9) follows.
b) Saddle-Point Approximation for NRRH > 1: In the multiple-array case, A will generally
not possess the Hermitian property that was exploited in Theorem 1. Therefore, we instead turn
to integral approximation techniques. Using the eigenvalue decomposition A = UDU† and a
strategy similar to the one proposed in [22], the probability (7) can be transformed into a one-
dimensional integral, for any real-valued parameter β > 0, stated in the following proposition
Proposition 1 (Alternative Formulation of Worst-Case Missed Detection Probability):
p
(Opt. PMA)
MD = −
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
e−c(ω)
(β − jω)|I+ (β − jω)D|dω, (14)
with the arbitrary real constant β > 0, b = Q†EµE, and
c(ω) = b†
(
I+
1
jω − βD
−1
)−1
b. (15)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Although neither this integral is computable in closed form, it is easier to handle than the
brute force NRRHNRx-dimensional integral over the CSCG vector h. Here we use a saddle-point
method to approximate the integral (14) in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Approximation of Worst-Case Missed Detection Probability for NRx ≥ 2): The
worst-case missed detection probability can be approximately evaluated as
p
(Opt. PMA)
MD ≈ −
1
2π
es(z0)e−j∠s
′′(z0)
√
2π
|s′′(z0)| , (16)
where
s(z) = −b†
(
I+
1
z
D−1
)−1
b− ln(z)− ln(|I+ zD|), (17)
b = Q†EµE, and z0 is a stationary point such that s
′(z0) = 0.
Proof. With a change to the complex variable z = jω − β, we can write (14) as
p
(wc)
MD = −
1
j2π
∮ −β+j∞
−β−j∞
e−s(z)dz (18)
with s(z) defined according to (17). The saddle point method uses the approximation s(z) ≈
s(z0) +
1
2
s′′(z0)(z − z0)2 to write
p
(wc)
MD ≈ −
1
j2π
∮ −β+j∞
−β−j∞
e−(s(z0)+
1
2
s′′(z0)(z−z0)2)dz
= − 1
j2π
e−s(z0)
∮ −β+j∞
−β−j∞
e−
1
2
s′′(z0)(z−z0)2dz = − 1
j2π
e−s(z0)ejφ
√
2π
|s′′(z0)|
(19)
with φ = pi−∠s
′′(z0)
2
. Finally, we note that ejφ = je−j∠s
′′(z0) from which (16) follows.
B. Fixed Power Manipulation Strategy (Statistical CSI at Eve)
Suppose now that Eve can only choose a fixed strategy for ηEe
jψE , i.e., one that does not depend
on the instantaneous CSI hE. For example, Eve can choose a strategy based on knowledge of µA
and µE, which in practice could be obtained by using ray-tracing tools. For any fixed strategy,
we can clearly formulate the missed detection probability as
p
(Fixed PMA)
MD (T ) = P(‖ηEejψEhE − µA‖2Σ−1A < T/2) (20)
Note that we have ηEe
jψEhE−µA ∼ CN (µ,Σ) with µ = ηEejψEµE−µA and Σ = η2EΣE, so the
probability (20) again takes the form of a CDF of a complex Gaussian quadratic form. Hence,
we can calculate (20) by using the following corollary to Theorem 2:
Corollary 1: For the fixed power manipulation strategy, we get p
(Fixed PMA)
MD (T ) by replacing h¯E
with ηEe
jψEhE−µA in (8) and apply the saddle-point approximation as described in Theorem 2.
Note that the approach in Corollary 1 also allows us to evaluate the missed detection probability
without power manipulation attack by letting ηE = 1 and ψE = 0.
Finally, in the following definition we provide a special case of fixed strategy when Eve has
only statistical CSI knowledge:
Definition 5 (Power Manipulation Attack Based On Statistical CSI):
η(stat)E =
|µ†AΣ−1A µE|
µ
†
EΣ
−1
A µE
, ψ(stat)E = − arg{µ†AΣ−1A µE}, (21)
The motivation behind strategy (21) is to use the strategy derived in Lemma 1 but assume the
strong LoS approximation hE ≈ µE.
C. Generalization to Imperfect CSI
The analysis provided thus far has assumed perfect CSI at Bob; however, a generalization
to i.i.d. CSI estimation noise is possible by extending Σ
(j)
i =
P
(j)
i
KRice+1
Λ + σ2nI, where σ
2
n is the
estimation noise variance. Note that under this assumption, the saddle-point approximation in
Theorem 2 applies straightforwardly, while the closed-form solution in Theorem 1 only applies
under the assumption of uncorrelated antennas Λ = I. Due to space limitations, we have not
included estimation errors in the system model or in our numerical results, and the impact of
estimation errors is left for future studies.
IV. OPTIMAL ATTACK POSITION
In this section, we study the problem of finding the optimal attack position with respect to a
given deployment. We will denote Alice’s and Eve’s spatial positions by ξA and ξE, respectively,
and assume that Eve knows the deployment and position of the legitimate device. Obviously,
a straightforward solution for optimizing p
(Opt. PMA)
MD (ξE) is to pick ξA = ξE which will result in
p
(Opt. PMA)
MD = 1−pFA. However, a basic underlying assumption is that the attacker is significantly
separated from the legitimate device since the authentication method in-itself is predicated on
this spatial separation in order to work. Therefore, here we rather seek locally optimal attacker
positions that are outside the immediate neighborhood of the legitimate device. We start with
defining and characterizing the objective function and identify properties of local optima that
we exploit in our heuristic search algorithm. The algorithm is then presented in Section IV-E.
A. General Optimization Problem
The optimal attack position is equivalent to the one maximizing p
(Opt. PMA)
MD (ξE) = P(d
(Opt. PMA)(hE) <
T ), that is, the worst-case position given that Eve is using the optimal power manipulation attack.
Straightforwardly, from rearranging (7), this problem can be rewritten in a convenient form, as
stated in the following definition:
Definition 6 (Optimal Position Attack): We define the region of allowed attack positions as R
and let µE(ξE),ΣE(ξE) denote the channel statistics induced by the attack position ξE ∈ R. The
optimal attack position is given as the solution to
ξ∗E = argmaxξE∈R P(Fobj(hE) > T
∗), (22)
where
Fobj(hE) =
|µ†AΣ−1A hE|2
h
†
EΣ
−1
A hE
(23)
is an objective function and T ∗ = µ†AΣ
−1
A µA − T/2 is a constant threshold.
Direct optimization of (22) results in a very complicated optimization problem due to the
somewhat complicated distribution of (23).
B. Characterization of Objective Function Under Strong LoS Assumption
First, let us consider the case of strong LoS conditions, i.e., when KRice is large and hE ≈
µE(ξE). In such a setting, the objective function in (23) is approximately Fobj(µE(ξE)). Under
these assumptions, our approach is to expand (23) to provide an understanding of how the missed
detection probability depends on the attack position. First, we introduce some notation related
to the positions of Alice and Eve with respect to the RRHs that will prove useful: We define
the distance ratios rj =
d
(j)
A
d
(j)
E
, the phase offsets ϕ
(j)
E =
2pid
(j)
E
λc
and ϕ
(j)
A =
2pid
(j)
A
λc
, phase differences
∆ϕj = ϕ
(j)
E − ϕ(j)A , and angular-sine differences ∆Ωj = Ω(j)E −Ω(j)A . Furthermore, we define the
per-array inner products of the angular responses as
S
(j)
ik = e(Ω
(j)
i )
†Λ−1e(Ω
(j)
k ), (24)
for i, k ∈ {A,E}.
For certain correlation matrices, we can additionally expand the inner products S
(j)
EA according
to the following lemma:
Lemma 2: For any correlation matrix with inverse in the form Λ−1 = T +M, where T is a
symmetric Toeplitz matrix defined by the first column [t0, ..., tN−1]
T andM is a diagonal matrix
with [M]k,l = m0 for k = l = 2, ..., N − 1 (i.e., all diagonal elements equal except the first and
last one being zero), we have
S
(j)
EA = e
j2pi
NRx−1
2
∆r∆Ωjg(Ω
(j)
E ), (25)
where g(Ω
(j)
E ) is a real-valued function.
Proof. The sum along the main diagonal in T will take the form
∑NRx−1
n=0 t0e
j2pi∆r∆Ωjn, which
possesses the property in (25) according to exponential sum formulas. This property extends to
all the remaining diagonals in T and M but the details are left out due to space limitations.
Based on these definitions, we provide the expanded representation of Fobj(µE(ξE)) in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3 (Expanded Objective Function):
Fobj(µE(ξE)) = KRice
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑NRRH
j=1
√
r¯j|g(Ω(j)E )|ejφ
(j)
0√∑NRRH
j=1 r¯jS
(j)
EE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(26)
with φ
(j)
0 = ∆ϕj + 2π
NRx−1
2
∆r∆Ωj +
pi
2
[sign{g(Ω(j)E } − 1] and r¯j =
rβj
∑NRRH
l
rβ
l
where β is the
path-loss exponent.
Proof. We obtain (26) by expanding (23) using the block diagonal structure ofΣA, the definitions
of µE and µA according to (1), and the result in Lemma 2.
By inspecting (26), we can make two key observations that we will later exploit in Sec-
tion IV-E:
1) Small-scale optimization of Fobj(µE(ξE)) depends on the complex coefficients e
jφ
(j)
0 related
to the phase-relation of transmissions received at each RRH.
2) Large-scale optimization depends on the angular responses |g(Ω(j)E )| and the normalized
distance ratios r¯k.
C. Impact of Fading Correlation
In addition to the general result in Lemma 2, we provide the angular response g(∆Ωj) in
closed form under two special cases, summarized in the two following lemmas:
Lemma 4 (Uncorrelated Antennas): Given the assumption of uncorrelated antennas (Λ = I),
we have
g(∆Ωj) =
sin(π∆rNRx∆Ωj)
NRx sin(π∆r∆Ωj)
(27)
Proof. This follows from the conceptual proof of Lemma 2 with t0 = 1 and ti = 0 for i > 0.
Lemma 5: For the exponential correlation matrix Λk,l = ρ
−|k−l|, we have
g(∆Ωj) =
1
(1− ρ2) sin(π∆r∆Ωj))
×[ sin(π∆rNRx∆Ωj) + ρ2 sin(π∆r(NRx − 2)∆Ωj)
−2ρ cos(π∆r(ΩE,k + ΩA,k)) sin(π∆r(NRx − 1)∆Ωj
]
.
(28)
Proof. The inverse of the exponential correlation matrix is a Toeplitz matrix with t0 =
1
1−ρ2
,
t1 =
ρ2
1−ρ2
, t2 =
−2ρ
1−ρ2
, and ti = 0 for i > 2. The rest follows from the same idea as in the proof
of Lemma 2.
D. Characterization of Locally Optimal Attack Positions for Uncorrelated Antenna Fading and
NRRH = 2
To simplify the analysis, we assume a deployment of two RRHs and uncorrelated antenna
fading. In the case of uncorrelated antenna fading, it is easy to find that S
(j)
EE = 1 and, thus, we
have
∑NRRH
k=1 r¯kS
(j)
EE = 1. Moreover, with the assumption of NRRH = 2, we can write the expanded
objective function as
Fobj(µE(ξE)) =
∣∣∣√r¯1|g(∆Ω1)|ejφ(1)0 +√r¯2|g(∆Ω2)|ejφ(2)0 ∣∣∣2 . (29)
The aforementioned small-scale local optima allow us to reduce the optimization search to a
set of spatial sampling points for which we have a specific phase relation as specified in the
following lemma:
Lemma 6 (Small-Scale Spatial SamplingNRRH = 2): The small-scale local optima of Fobj(µE(ξE))
are found at points where ejφ
(1)
0 = ejφ
(2)
0 . At such points we have
Fobj(µE(ξE)) = (
√
r¯1|g(∆Ω1)|+
√
r¯2|g(∆Ω2)|)2. (30)
Proof. Clearly, the norm of (29) is maximized when arg(
√
r¯k|g(Ω(j)E )|ejφ
(j)
0 ) = φ
(j)
0 = φ0 for
both RRHs.
Remark 1: Lemma 6 generalizes to NRRH > 2 by considering points where e
jφ
(1)
0 = ejφ
(2)
0 =
· · · = ejφ(NRRH)0 . However, note that the existence of points with optimal phase alignment with
respect to more than two arrays at a time is not guaranteed and depends on the RRH deployment
and Alice’s position.
Now let us restrict the angular sine differences to the set ∆Ω ∈ A, where A is a set of local
optima of the angular response |g(∆Ω)|.
Remark 2: Note that for RRH j, we have ∆Ω = sin(Φ
(j)
E )− sin(Φ(j)A ) which implies that each
local optima ∆Ω ∈ A is associated with two attack angles Φ(j,+)E = sin−1(∆Ω+ sin(Φ(j)A )) and
Φ
(j,−)
E = π − Φ(j,+)E .
Now we can characterize the large-scale local optima in the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Large-Scale Local Optima for NRRH = 2 arrays): At far-field points where r¯k re-
main approximately constant in the local neighborhood, large-scale local optima of Fobj(µE(ξE))
are found at the intersection points of the set lines with AoAs associated with angular sines
∆Ω ∈ A.
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 2. Illustration of candidate points for optimal attacker position with NRRH = 2 RRHs. Dashed lines indicate the rays with
AoA Φ∗E,l.
Proof. Lets choose two particular angular sines ∆Ω1,∆Ω2 ∈ A. Let ξ∗E denote the intersection
point between the lines2 with AoAs Φ
(1,+)
E and Φ
(2,+)
E . Now from the definition of A, we know
that |g(∆Ωk + ǫk)| < |g(∆Ωk)| for k = 1, 2 and ǫk sufficiently small so that we stay in the
neighborhood of the local optima of g(·). Clearly, if we deviate from ξ∗E to a point ξ′E with any
angle offsets ǫ1 and ǫ2, where the deviation is small such that r¯k is approximately constant, then
we see that
2Generally, such an intersection point might not exist; however, for the proof of this theorem we assume that ∆Ω1 and ∆Ω2
are chosen such that it does.
Fobj(µE(ξ
′
E)) = KRice
(√
r¯1|g(∆Ω1 + ǫ1)|+
√
r¯2|g(∆Ω2 + ǫ2)|
)2
(31)
< KRice
(√
r¯1|g(∆Ω1)|+
√
r¯2|g(∆Ω2)|
)2
= Fobj(µE(ξ
∗
E)), (32)
which shows that ξ∗E is a large-scale local optima of Fobj(µE(ξE)).
Fig. 2 provides an illustration of the intersection points considered in Theorem 3.
The analysis thus far provides us with characterizations of small- and large-scale locally
optimal points under certain assumptions. In the final part of this section, we will exploit these
results to develop a heuristic truncated search algorithm that can be used to find the optimal
attack position in the general case efficiently.
E. Heuristic Search Method for General Deployments and Rice Fading
Our proposed search method can be summarized as follows: (i) In accordance with Theorem 3,
reduce the search to points where AoAs are within the main lobe of a RRH or intersections
of 1st order side-lobes. (ii) Based on Lemma 6, use the function Fsmall-scale(ξE) defined below
to find find small-scale locally optimal points. (iii) Compute the missed detection probability
p
(Opt. Position)
MD for the truncated set of small-scale local optima from step (ii).
The search algorithm is based on the following definitions: We let
Fsmall-scale(ξE) =
∣∣∣∣∣
NRRH∑
k=1
ejφ
(j)
0 (ξE)
∣∣∣∣∣ (33)
be a small-scale optimization function for finding small-scale locally optimal points and let
B(ξE, ǫ) define the set of points within distance ǫ from attack position ξE. For RRH j, the
main lobe AoAs are Φ
(j)
main = {Φ(k)A , π − Φ(k)A } and we let Φ(j)1st denote the first side lobe AoA
(local maxima) of the angular response. Based on this, the sets of searched AoA are defined as
A(j)main = [Φ(j)main − δ−,Φ(j)main + δ+] where δ+/− is chosen such that
∣∣∣g (sin(Φ(j)main)− sin(Φ(k)A ))∣∣∣ =
g0
∣∣∣g (sin(Φ(j)main ± δ)− sin(Φ(k)A ))∣∣∣, for a constant g0. The AoA search set for the first side lobe
A(j)1st is similarly defined. Based on these definitions, Algorithm 1 describes the steps of the
search method in mathematical detail. In related work, sometimes the main lobe beam width is
defined as 2/Lr where Lr = λc∆rNRx represents the array length. This definition can also be
used in our problem, but note that the parametric choice based on g0 is more general as it allows
us to tune the beam width considered in the search.
Algorithm 1 Truncated Search: Critical Attack Positions
1: procedure FINDOPTIMALATTACKPOSITION(R) ⊲ Search allowed region R
2: for j = 1, · · · , NRRH do
3: P ← {ξE ∈ R; Φ(j)E ∈ A(j)main} ⊲ Mainlobes
4: for k = 1, · · · , NRRH and k 6= j do
5: P ← P ∪ {ξE ∈ R; Φ(j)E ∈ A(j)1st ∧ Φ(k)E ∈ A(k)1st } ⊲ Intersect. of sidelobes
6: end for
7: PCritical(j)← {ξE ∈ P;Fsmall-scale(ξE) ≥ Fsmall-scale(ξ)∀ξ ∈ B(ξE, ǫ)}
8: ⊲ Restrict to small-scale local optima
9: end for
10: p
(Opt. Position)
MD = maxξE∈∪NRRHj=1 PCritical(j)
p
(Opt. PMA)
MD (ξE)
11: end procedure
At a first glance, it may appear as an arbitrary choice to restrict the search to the main lobes
and intersections of 1st order side lobes. However, the structure of the maxima of the angular
responses in Lemma 4 and 5 induces a decreasing hierarchy of side lobe maxima. Unfortunately,
an analytical characterization of the objective function with respect to the impact of the local
maxima of g(·) is difficult, since distances change with intersection points as well. However, our
numerical results presented in the next section confirm that it is sufficient to restrict the search
to intersections of first-order side lobes since local optima of higher order side lobes are inferior.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically study the detection performance under the considered attack
strategies for different distributed network topologies. We consider a system deployed in a 80
m×60 m area, as depicted in Fig. 3. In the area there are 9 potential RRH locations RRH1-RRH9
where antenna arrays of varying sizes can be placed, a legitimate device Alice, and the attacker
Eve. For all the subsequent results, we assume that the normalized antenna separation ∆r = 0.5,
the path-loss exponent β = 2, and that the system operates at fc = 2.4 GHz center frequency.
Moreover, for the following results the authentication threshold T is fixed for pFA = 10
−2 unless
stated otherwise.
A. Validation of Saddle-Point Approximation
In Fig. 4 and 5, we validate the approximation of the missed detection probability (MDP)
under the power manipulation attack for a variety of parameter choices and compare the results
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Fig. 3. The 80 m×60 m network deployment area used for numerical evaluations: 9 fixed RRH locations A1-A9, legitimate
transmitter device Alice, and the attacker Eve.
to Monte-Carlo simulations. We plot the missed detection probability both under optimal power
manipulation, i.e., p(Opt. PMA)MD and without power manipulation. The curves represent the evalua-
tion of the saddle-point approximation in Theorem 2, and the Monte-Carlo simulation results,
indicated by the cross markers, are computed based on 107 channel realizations sampled from
CSCG distributions. The results are based on a deployment of NRRH = 3 RRHs (RRH locations
1, 3, and 8) with NRx = 2 antennas each. Alice and Eve are located at ξA = (65 m, 30 m) and
ξE = (26 m, 49 m), respectively.
The first thing to note from Fig. 4 and 5 is that the proposed saddle-point approximation
provides accurate results for all parameter ranges. Small approximation errors can be observed
which generally seem to upper bound the true values obtained from the Monte Carlo simulations.
Fig. 4(a) shows the missed detection probability for varying false alarm probabilities (i.e., this
is the receiver operating characteristic curve for varying choices of threshold T ). Observe that
Eve gains significantly (i.e., several orders of magnitude) in success probability by using the
optimal attack strategy. Fig. 4(b) shows the same missed detection probabilities but for varying
total number of receive antennas where we can see that the missed detection probability generally
decreases with the number of antennas as expected.
In Fig. 5(a), we plot the missed detection probability as Eve moves along the xE-axis with
fixed yE = 49 m, illustrating that the detection performance is varying with small variations in
attacker position. Fig. 5(b) illustrates the missed detection probability for varying values of the
fading correlation coefficient ρ. We generally observe a decreasing missed detection probability
as the magnitude |ρ| increases. Note that the fading correlation coefficient ρ represents the
correlation in the channel fading; i.e., ρ = 0 represents independent fading across antennas and
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Fig. 4. Saddle-point approximation of p
(Opt. PMA)
MD compared to Monte-Carlo simulations for a NRRH = 3 RRH deployment for:
(a) different false alarm probabilities and (b) varying total number of deployed antennas NRRHNRx.
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Fig. 5. Saddle-point approximation of p
(Opt. PMA)
MD compared to Monte-Carlo simulations for a NRRH = 3 RRH deployment for:
(a) small variations in Eve’s position and (b) varying correlation coefficient ρ.
ρ = 1 represents full correlation. From Fig. 4 and 5, we can also observe that the detection
performance increases (missed detection probability decreases) with increasing Rice factor KRice
as expected.
B. Impacts of Power Manipulation Attack
In Fig. 6, we illustrate the detection performance under the power manipulation attack with
NRRH = 2 at locations RRH2 and RRH4 and Alice positioned at ξA = (40 m, 30 m). In
the lefthand axis of Fig. 6(a), we show the missed detection probability under the power
manipulation strategy for perfect and statistical CSI knowledge at Eve. The righthand axis shows
the corresponding power manipulation amplitude ηE for the statistical CSI strategy in (21). We
observe that for positions close to RRH4, Eve can achieve close to the optimal success probability
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Fig. 6. Detection performance under power manipulation attack for varying CSI knowledge: (a) for varying attack position
and (b) for fixed position with varying Rice factor.
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Fig. 7. Missed detection probability under optimal power manipulation for different attack positions along: (a) a line with fixed
AoA with respect to RRH4 and (b) a range of AoAs with respect to RRH4 where distance is optimized to obtain the maximum
MDP.
with only statistical CSI knowledge. As expected, we can also observe that the required power
manipulation amplitude ηE increases with distance since Eve needs to compensate for the
higher path-loss compared to Alice’s channel. In Fig. 6(b), we show the same missed detection
probabilities but for a fixed attack position ξE = (32 m, 30 m) and varying LoS strength in terms
of the Rice factor KRice. We again observe that Eve can achieve close to the optimal performance
with only statistical CSI knowledge. However, we also observe that both probabilities decay
rapidly with increased LoS strength.
C. Optimization of Attacker Position
In Fig. 7 we consider a deployment with NRRH = 2 arrays with NRx = 8 antennas each,
positioned according to RRH2 and RRH4 in Fig. 3. In this figure the LoS strength is KRice = 6
dB. In Fig. 7(a), both Alice and Eve are centered in front of RRH4 and Eve is varying her distance
with respect to this array. Firstly, the upper part of Fig. 7(a) illustrates that, by following the
result in Lemma 6, we can appropriately sample the local maxima of p
(Opt.PMA)
MD . We observe
that the sampled envelope of the MDP approaches 1 − pFA ≈ 1 when the distance comes close
to 25 m since this means that Eve is very close to Alice’s position. The lower part illustrates
the objective function Fobj(ξE) in (26) and the two angular response inner products S
(1)
AE and
S
(2)
AE given by (24). We observe that the envelope of the MDP curve (in the upper plot) closely
resembles the shape of the objective function (in the lower plot) which justifies the use of Fobj
for optimization in our heuristic approach. S
(2)
AE follows the angular response for the second
array (i.e., RRH4) and illustrates that the best attack positions on this straight line are located at
the intersections with the side lobes of the second array. The fact that S
(1)
AE remains constant is
expected since Eve is moving along the main lobe of the first array (i.e., RRH3) and does not
change the AoA with respect to this array.
In exactly the same scenario as above, Fig. 7(b) shows the worst-case MDP along a given
AoA with respect to RRH4. In this figure, the worst-case MDP was obtained by exhaustive
search along a straight line for each AoA. The solid line indicates the true maximum MDP
along the corresponding AoA. The cross markers illustrate the corresponding MDP obtained by
maximizing Fobj(ξE) along the corresponding AoA. Their agreement again illustrates that the
heuristic approach, that optimizes Fobj(ξE), provides valid results. Moreover, we can observe that
if Eve is not allowed close to Alice (e.g., Φ
(1)
E > 0.2 rad) there is a local optimal AoA around
Φ
(1)
E = 0.4 (the first local maxima for positive Φ
(1)
E ) that agrees well with the first side lobe of
RRH4.
Fig. 8 exemplifies a result of the optimization algorithm proposed in Section IV-E over the
entire deployment area. For this example, we have assumed KRice = 6 dB, pFA = 10
−2, ρ = 0,
NRx = 8, and NRRH = 2. The red-shaded regions in Fig. 8(a) mark the areas that are searched,
i.e., main lobes and intersections of side lobes. We have defined the allowed regionR as positions
further than 6 m from Alice and 3 m from the RRHs. In this map, we show the obtained local
optimal positions, and the global optimal position obtained by our approach compared to the
true global optimal position obtained by an exhaustive search. We can see that the heuristic
approach finds the true worst-case position that lies within one of the search areas along the
main lobe of RRH1. For this scenario, the worst-case MDP is around 10−3. Fig. 8(b) shows the
objective function values and corresponding MDP for each of the candidate positions. We can
observe that the positions with larger objective function values are, in fact, the positions with
higher MDP.
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Fig. 8. Example of optimization for Scenario A: (a) map over considered deployment and marked positions; (b) the
corresponding objective function values and MDPs.
In Fig. 9, we illustrate heat-maps of the log-MDP for four different deployment scenarios. It
is important to note that in every deployment the total number of deployed antennas is fixed
to NRRHNRx = 16. We have truncated the MDP values so that the completely yellow regions
correspond to a MDP less than 10−15. In the second deployment (i.e., with NRRH = 2, NRx = 8),
it is possible to see that many side lobe intersections are associated with slightly increased MDP
values indicated by blue regions.
D. Comparison of Deployment Scenarios
In Table I, we summarize the results from evaluating the search algorithm for different
deployment scenarios. For these results we applied an exclusion region of points within 6 m from
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Fig. 9. Heat-maps of log-MDP log10(p
(Opt. PMA)
MD ) for different deployment scenarios.
Scenario NRRH NRx Tot. # antennas p
(Opt. Position)
MD Coverage # Search pos. # Small-scale local optima
A 2 8 16 7.469913e-04 99,96% 9730 (3,5%) 278263
B 4 4 16 9.377572e-01 97,96% 40649 (10,1%) 401358
C 8 2 16 6.260576e-01 99,77% 105431 (29,9%) 352295
D 2 6 12 7.367218e-02 97,84% 5923 (2,1%) 277892
E 3 4 12 9.558150e-01 94,96% 28665 (7,3%) 394787
F 4 3 12 9.803737e-01 92,23% 55750 (13,9%) 400514
G 6 2 12 9.266438e-01 96,74% 96962 (27,2%) 356388
TABLE I. Summary of results for deployment scenarios A-G.
Alice and within 3 m from each RRH. For each scenario, the table shows the obtained worst-case
MDP, the area coverage in percent, number of small-scale sampling positions searched by the
algorithm, and the total number of small-scale sampling positions in the entire deployment area.
Area coverage is here defined as the percentage of points with p
(Opt. PMA)
MD < 10
−4.
For comparison, consider that an exhaustive search with sampling resolution of λc/10 = 0.0125
m would result in a complexity on the order of 107 positions in the considered 80 m×60 m area.
From Table I, we see that the final number of search positions are in orders ranging from 103
(Scenario A and D) to 105 (Scenario C), representing a significant complexity reduction compared
to the exhaustive search. This reduction is generally larger for less distributed scenarios (e.g.
only 3.5% of all the local optima are searched for Scenario A). The reason for this is twofold:
(i) with fewer RRHs, there are fewer main lobes and intersection regions in total, and (ii) with
more antennas per array, the beams of each RRH are more directed, and thus, the main lobe
and intersection areas become smaller.
For the considered settings, the NRRH = 2 deployments (scenario A and D) provide the lowest
worst-case MDP for the given total number of antennas. These scenarios also result in the highest
coverage. We can also observe that the more distributed scenarios NRRH > 2 all result in a worst-
case MDP close to 1. While noting that this observation depends on the choice of exclusion
region, which in this case is a 6 m disc around Alice, these results indicate that distributing
antennas to more than NRRH = 2 locations provides no additional benefits in terms of worst-case
missed detection probability. That is, for a NRRH = 2 deployment, one should rather invest in
adding antennas to the existing RRHs than in distributing the antennas further.
E. Discussion
The numerical results have illustrated how the obtained performance guarantees depends on
deployment strategy, exclusion region, LoS strength, and fading correlation. In reality, only some
of these parameters can be influenced for security purposes. Channel characteristics such as LoS
strength are obviously mostly determined by the environment where the system is deployed.
Here, we can only conclude that the studied authentication scheme would be better suitable
where strong LoS channels are expected (e.g., in an open industry hall or a road side). Fading
correlation, which according to our results improves detection performance, can to some extent
be influenced through system design by densely spaced arrays; however, note that in our model
such a modification would also affect the normalized antenna separation, and consequently, the
beam-forming pattern.
The studied deployment scenarios indicate some lessons on how RRH positioning could be
influenced during system design for security purposes. Firstly, we have observed that a single
RRH deployment is very vulnerable to a power manipulation attack as long as the attacker is
positioned along the same AoA as the legitimate device (see e.g., first plot in Fig. 9). With that
observation in mind, our results clearly illustrates the benefits of a distributed approach compared
to the single RRH scenario. In terms of worst-case MDP, however, our results show no benefits
of further distributing the antennas to more than two RRHs, and a comparison of Scenario A
and D suggests that narrowing the beams of two existing arrays by adding more antennas is
more beneficial than adding additional RRHs. However, note that this generally is a question
of what assumptions we make regarding the exclusion region (i.e., how close to the legitimate
device can an attacker realistically be expected to come). Compare, for example, the deployment
NRRH = 2 and NRRH = 8 in Fig. 9 where it can be argued that the 8 RRH deployment would
be preferable to protect against attackers close to the edges of the deployment area (e.g., in a
case where it is unlikely that an attacker can get physically close to the legitimate device). To
fully answer such questions, further assumptions on the type of system are needed like, e.g., if
the system is publicly deployed, if devices are mobile or stationary, and if it is likely that an
internal device could be an attacker, etc.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented methods for analyzing worst-case detection performance
bounds for physical layer authentication in a wireless network with a distributed architecture.
This analysis is motivated by the problem of providing strict guarantees that are required if
physical layer authentication is to be considered as a viable security technique in future mission-
critical communications. To address this problem, we have defined two different attack strategies:
the power manipulation attack and optimal position attack and provided mathematical tools for
finding the worst-case missed detection performance under the optimal strategies.
Our results indicate that a distributed architecture can significantly reduce the worst-case
missed detection probability for fixed number of antennas. However, for the considered deploy-
ment scenario, our worst-case analysis has shown no performance improvements from distributing
antennas on more than two RRHs. That is, for a distributed system with two remote radio heads,
instead of adding a third array one should rather use additional antennas to narrow the beams
of the existing two arrays. Moreover, we note that the authentication scheme in the distributed
RRH architecture remains to be analyzed from a delay perspective.
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APPENDIX
A. Optimal Power Manipulation Strategy
Recall that d(ρEe
jϕEhE) is the discriminant function that the attacker is trying to minimize.
We note that by using a Cholesky factorization Σ−1A = Q
†
AQA, we can write
d(ρEe
jϕEhE) = ‖ρEejϕEhE − µA‖2Σ−1
A
= 2‖QA(ρEejϕEhE − µA)‖2
= 2(ρ2E‖QAhE‖2 + ‖QAµA‖2 − 2ρEℜ{ejϕE(QAµA)†QAhE}).
(34)
Taking the derivative w.r.t. ρE , we get
∂
∂ρE
d(ρEe
jϕEhE) = 4ρE‖QAhE‖2−4ℜ{ejϕE(QAµA)†QAhE}
and, hence, ρ∗E such that
∂
∂ρE
d(ρEe
jϕEhE) = 0 results in
ρ∗E =
ℜ{ejϕE(QAµA)†QAhE}
‖QAhE‖2 =
ℜ{ejϕEµ†AΣ−1A hE}
h
†
EΣ
−1
A hE
. (35)
Plugging (35) into (34), we get
d(ρ∗Ee
jϕEhE) = 2
(
µ
†
AΣ
−1
A µA −
ℜ{ejϕEµ†AΣ−1A hE}2
h
†
EΣ
−1
A hE
)
. (36)
Clearly, d(ρ∗Ee
jϕEhE) is minimized when e
jϕEµ
†
AΣ
−1
A hE is real-valued so that ℜ{ejϕEµ†AΣ−1A hE} =
|µ†AΣ−1A hE |, which is obtained by setting ϕ∗E = − arg{µ†AΣ−1A hE}. Plugging ϕ∗E into (36) and
rearranging yields (6) which completes the proof.
B. Integral Representation
Introducing, h¯E = b+ h, we can integrate over the PDF of h ∼ CN (0, I) according to
p
(wc)
MD (T ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
πN
e−h
†hU((b+ h)†A(b+ h))dh, (37)
where U(·) denotes the Heaviside step function. By using the Laplace representation3 1−U(x) =
− 1
2pi
∫∞
−∞
e−x(jω−β)
jω−β
dω valid for β > 0, we can rewrite (37) as
∫ ∞
−∞
1
πN
e−h
†h
[
− 1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(jω−β)(b+h)
†A(b+h)
jω − β dω
]
dh = − 1
2πN+1
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
e−h
†h−(b+h)†(jω−β)A(b+h)
jω − β dωdh.
(38)
Using the decomposition A = UDU†, the transformations h˜ = U†h and b¯ = U†b, and the
fract that dh = dh˜, we can write (38) as
− 1
2πN+1
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
e−h˜
†h˜−(h˜+b¯)†(jω−β)D(h˜+b¯)
jω − β dωdh˜ = −
1
2πN+1
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
e−(h˜+b˜)
†B(h˜+b˜)−c(ω)
jω − β dωdh˜,
(39)
with B = I + (jω − β)D, b˜ =
(
I+ 1
jω−β
D−1
)−1
b¯, and c(ω) = b¯†
(
I+ 1
jω−β
D−1
)−1
b¯. We
can then integrate out h˜ by noting that (39) can be written as
− 1
2π
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
1
πN
e−(h˜+b˜)
†B(h˜+b˜)dh˜
e−c(ω)
jω − β dω = −
1
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
e−c(ω)
(jω − β)|I+ (jω − β)D|dω, (40)
where we have used the fact that the Gaussian integral
∫∞
−∞
1
piN
e−(h˜+b˜)
†B(h˜+b˜)dh˜ = 1
|B|
is solvable
in closed form.
3According to [22], it is more convenient to work with 1− U(x) when evaluating the complementary CDF.
